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ABSTRACT 
The United States Supreme Court last decided a federal income tax 
case on constitutional grounds in 1920⎯a century ago. The case was 
Eisner v. Macomber, and the issue was whether Congress had the power 
under the Sixteenth Amendment to include stock dividends in the tax 
base. The Court answered “no” because “income” in the Sixteenth 
Amendment meant “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from 
both combined.” A stock dividend was not “income” because it did not 
increase the wealth of the shareholder. 
Macomber was never formally overruled, and it is sometimes still 
cited by academics and practitioners for the proposition that the 
Constitution requires that income be “realized” to be subject to tax. 
However, in Glenshaw Glass, the Court held in the context of treble 
antitrust damages that the Macomber definition of income for 
constitutional purposes “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all 
future gross income questions” and that a better definition encompassed 
all “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and 
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.” 
In the century that has passed since Macomber, the Court has never 
held that a federal income tax statute was unconstitutional. This behavior 
of the Court constitutes a remarkable example of American tax 
exceptionalism, because in most other countries income tax laws are  
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subject to constitutional review and are frequently ruled 
unconstitutional. 
In what follows, we will first examine three examples of how income 
tax law is constitutionalized in other countries (Part 1). We will then look 
at some of the larger tax expenditures in the U.S. and ask how they would 
fare under constitutional scrutiny (Part 2). Finally, we will attempt to 
answer the question whether US income tax law should be 
constitutionalized, and answer in a reluctant negative (Part 3). But we 
will also urge Congress, which is equally charged with upholding 
constitutional values, to take horizontal equity more into consideration 
when evaluating tax expenditures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court last decided a federal income tax 
case on constitutional grounds in 1920—a century ago. The case was 
Eisner v. Macomber,1 and the Court confronted the question of 
whether the Sixteenth Amendment2 empowered Congress to include 
 
 1.  252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
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stock dividends in the tax base.3 The Court answered “no,” because 
“income” in the Sixteenth Amendment meant “the gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined.”4 Because stock dividends 
did not increase the wealth of the shareholder, they were not “income” 
for the purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment.5 
Though the Court never formally overruled Macomber,6 it 
effectively did so in Glenshaw Glass.7 There, the Court held that the 
Macomber definition of income “was not meant to provide a 
touchstone to all future [constitutional] gross income questions” and 
that a better definition should encompass all “instances of undeniable 
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers 
have complete dominion.”8  
In the century since Macomber, the Court has never declared a 
federal income tax statute to be unconstitutional.9 The Court’s 
behavior constitutes a remarkable example of American tax 
exceptionalism because in most other countries income tax laws are 
subject to constitutional review and are frequently held 
unconstitutional. 
Why does the United States deviate so significantly from the norm? 
A common answer is that the Court became wary of constitutionalizing 
income tax law after Macomber, which was widely regarded as wrongly 
decided. In particular, tax academics have warned the Court against 
constitutionalizing income tax law because that would mean that 
Congress could not fix their mistakes. The United States Court of 
 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
 3.  Macomber, 252 U.S. at 199. 
 4.  Id. at 207 (quoting Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)). 
 5.  Justice Brandeis in dissent pointed out that under this reading a cash dividend was not 
income either, because it decreases the value of the stock, so the overall wealth of the taxpayer is 
not affected. He argued that realization was a matter of administrative convenience, not 
constitutional law, and most commentators now accept his view. Id. at 224. Justice Holmes 
likewise dissented on the ground that “I think that the word ‘incomes’ in the Sixteenth 
Amendment should be read in ”a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time 
of its adoption.” For it was for public adoption that it was proposed. The known purpose of this 
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt 
that most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like 
the present to rest. I am of opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax.” Id. at 220. 
 6.  Macomber is sometimes still cited by academics and practitioners for the proposition 
that the Constitution requires that income be “realized” to be subject to tax. 
 7.  C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  The Court has sometimes held federal non-income taxes to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dared venture into these 
waters in Murphy v. IRS,10 holding that taxing damages for non-
physical injuries was unconstitutional because they were not 
“income.”11 The reaction was swift and negative, and the court 
ultimately retracted its opinion.12 
But this is not the whole story, because the Court frequently 
invalidates state tax laws on equal protection grounds13 and on 
Commerce Clause grounds.14 In the latter type of cases, even though 
Congress can overrule the Court (because it has the authority to 
regulate interstate commerce), it rarely does so—meaning that the 
Court sometimes finds it necessary to overrule itself.15 
The main reason for U.S. exceptionalism in this area is textualism 
and the lack of a well-developed doctrine of proportionality. In other 
countries where tax laws are subjected to judicial review, an initial 
determination that a given tax law deviates from constitutional equal 
protection is followed by: (a) an inquiry into legislative purpose (which 
would be suspect to textualists); and (b) a determination whether the 
deviation from equal protection is proportional to the legislative 
purpose, or could be achieved by less restrictive means.16 The Court is 
ill-equipped to conduct such an inquiry because it may not be willing 
to inquire about legislative purpose, and even if it did, it does not have 
 
 10.  Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
 11.  Id. at 92. 
 12.  See, e.g., Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis 
of Murphy V. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 186 (2007); Paul Caron, Tax 
Protestor Cases After Murphy, TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 24, 2006), 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/08/tax_protester_c.html; Ellen Aprill, Ruling 
Undermines Base of the Federal Income Tax System, DAILY JOURNAL, 2006, 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/Aprill.pdf. 
 13.  See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S. 
Ct. 2213, 2224 (2019); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 468 (2000); Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985); 
Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622 (1985); WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 
117, 121 (1968); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 566 
(1935); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 550 (1934); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 517 (1933); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 517 (1926). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (2018); Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967). 
 16.  See, e.g., Oliver Lepsius, Constitutional Review of Tax Laws and the Unconstitutionality 
of the German Inheritance Tax, 16 GER. L .J. 1191 (2015); Yoseph Edrey,  פרשנות חוקתית וביקורת
 in Hebrew), Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Review on Fiscal)שיפוטית על חקיקה פיסקלית 
Legislation (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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a well-developed doctrine of proportionality to draw upon. The Court 
only has the levels of scrutiny (rational basis, intermediate, strict), 
which are not flexible enough to evaluate nuanced tax distinctions, 
which require a careful balancing of all the costs and benefits of a 
departure from equality. 
Several problems arise because the Court refuses to 
constitutionalize tax law. One problem is that tax is relegated to be a 
technical subject fit only for specialists, rather than a subject at the 
heart of the relationship between the state and its citizens. Another 
problem is that many deviations from equal protection remain 
unexamined and continue unabated because Congress lacks the 
political will to limit them, primarily a result of lobbying pressure. 
In what follows, we will first examine three examples of how tax law 
is constitutionalized in other countries (Part 1). We will then look at 
some of the larger tax expenditures in the U.S. and ask how they would 
fare under constitutional scrutiny (Part 2). Finally, we will attempt to 
answer the question whether U.S. income tax law should be 
constitutionalized and reluctantly answer in the negative (Part 3). 
However, we will also urge Congress, which is equally charged with 
upholding constitutional values, to take horizontal equity more into 
consideration when evaluating tax expenditures. 
I.  A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In this part, we will survey how other developed countries 
constitutionalize tax law, drawing examples from Germany (where the 
practice is most developed), Italy, and Israel.17 The following will show 
that although each of these countries defines equal protection 
differently under its constitution, they all share a common feature: they 
evaluate distinctions between groups of people in the tax law not 
against a benchmark of an ideal tax system (as is done in the U.S.), but 
rather as deviations from equal treatment under the law. They then ask 
whether such deviations are proportional to the goal the legislature 
sought to achieve. This method is what the U.S. Congress should 
consider following in evaluating tax laws. 
 
 17.  Some of these examples are from other taxes, but most are from the income tax, which 
is the main source of revenue for all of these countries (although VAT is also important). In the 
US, because we do not have a VAT, the income tax dominates all other taxes at the federal level. 
But the payroll tax is also important and raises equal protection issues as well (e.g., because there 
is no link between what you pay and what you receive, why should the tax base be capped, and 
why are certain categories of workers exempt?). 
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A.  Germany 
In general, German tax literature views tax expenditures as 
legitimate means of implementing social and fiscal policy that are 
intended to influence economic behavior.18 Similarly to U.S. law, 
German law defines tax expenditures as exceptions to a general 
definition of income that results in lower tax revenues.19 Tax 
expenditures exist whenever the government fails to exercise its taxing 
rights to their fullest extent.20 Nonetheless, unlike the U.S. approach 
(which evaluates tax expenditures by comparing them to a normative 
base), the German approach interprets the tax statute based on the 
principles underlying the choice of income as a tax base, such as an 
ability to pay.21 These principles are viewed as giving rise to the choice 
of income as a tax base and, as such, provide guidance for structuring 
the income tax and for judging individual tax provisions.22 
German literature recognizes three groups of structural tax 
provisions. The first group includes provisions that are based on 
concepts of fairness, ability to pay, and service towards the main 
purpose of raising revenue. The scope of this group is determined by 
weighing the underlying concepts and principles of the tax system, such 
as equity and fairness. Those considerations require that the tax burden 
be allocated according to each individual’s ability to pay. Income is 
chosen as the base because it is seen as a proxy for one’s ability to pay. 
When tax provisions are aimed to correct for differences in ability to 
pay, they will fall into this first category.23 
The second group contains provisions that are not based on 
concepts of equity and fairness (as are reflected in the ability to pay 
concept), but that are nevertheless necessary for administrative 
purposes. These provisions have become inherent, structural parts of 
the tax system.24 
The third group includes provisions that are not aimed to account 
for differences in ability to pay and that are not based on allocative or 
administrative concerns, but instead are intended to fulfill other 
 
 18.  Harry A. Shannon III, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the United States and Germany: 
A Comparison, 33 TAX NOTES 201, 204 (Oct. 13, 1986). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 208. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 207. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 208. 
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purposes such as influencing taxpayer’s economic behavior. These are 
the provisions that constitute tax expenditures.25 As will be discussed 
below, the United States should adopt a similar analysis: one that is 
more focused on the underlying principles of the U.S. tax system, such 
as fairness and horizontal equity (which in turn are derived from the 
ability to pay principle) rather than focusing on the exact components 
of a normative tax base. 
In the last two decades, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassunggericht or “German Court”) has on multiple 
occasions held German federal tax laws unconstitutional.26 The 
principle of equality under Article 3 of the German Constitution (the 
“Basic Law”), which is similar to the concept of equal protection in 
American law, is the primary constitutional requirement invoked by the 
German Court in striking down tax laws. Tax laws usually trump other 
basic rights because German law and society view taxes as critically 
important: they finance the government and redistribute valuable 
resources. Because there is no other way to achieve these two goals 
except by taxation, tax laws rarely fail the proportionality test which 
also applies to other basic rights.27 
Tax expenditures, which distinguish between groups of taxpayers, 
are thus subject to the principle of equality. In German constitutional 
law, the principle of equality requires that equal things must be treated 
uniformly and unequal things must be treated differently. On its face, 
any unequal treatment must be based on a rational justification 
(rational basis). Under the complementary arbitrariness standard 
(Willkuerformel), a difference in treatment is acceptable as long as it is 
not arbitrary (i.e., unrelated to the legislative purpose). If this 
arbitrariness formula were the only constitutional test, most tax 
expenditures would easily withstand constitutional challenges. 
However, the principle of equality is also read in conjunction with 
other guaranteed rights.28 In the last two decades, the German Court 
has developed a higher standard for tax laws that impact other 
constitutional protections.29 Under this new formula, the German 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  For an overview, see generally Lepsius, supra note 16. 
 27.  Id. at 1193. 
 28.  VICTOR THURONYI ET AL., COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 72 (2d ed. 2016). 
 29.  The highest level of strict scrutiny is reserved under Article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
Basic Law to discrimination based on sex, belief, race, language, descent, origin, or political 
convictions. See Lepsius, supra note 16, at 1194. 
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Court requires a stronger justification than rationality or a lack of 
arbitrariness to uphold the law’s differential treatment of comparable 
conduct. The court evaluates the legislature’s stated policy motives 
using the proportionality principle, which is applicable whenever a 
deviation from equality relates to other rights, such as freedom of 
profession, speech, or assembly. The German Court demands detailed 
justifications for any statutory deviations, and merely the will of the 
legislative majority is insufficient.30 
On the basis of this general methodology, the German Court has 
developed a series of specific principles that apply to the constitutional 
review of tax laws that aim to influence behavior (regulatory or 
“steering taxes,” referred to as Lenkungsteuern) or when the law results 
in any distributional horizontal inequalities, such that equally situated 
taxpayers pay unequal amounts of taxes.31 These principles include: the 
ability to pay principle (Leistungsfaehigkeitprinzip), the strictly net 
principle requiring allowance of deductions (Nettoprinzip), the 
principle of logical consistency in tax law (Folgerichtigkeit), the 
doctrine of self-consistency (Widerspruchsfreiheit), the adherence to 
previous concepts (Konzeptbefolgung), and the requirement to typify 
the level of taxation (Typisierung). These principles are announced by 
the legislature and are derived from the general legislative scheme of 
the German tax code. 
Applying this type of scrutiny to regulatory taxes has led to 
numerous decisions striking down tax laws as unconstitutional. The tax 
courts (Finanzgerichte) and the Federal High Tax Court 
(Bundesfinanzhof) commonly refer cases to the German 
Constitutional Court for a determination of the law’s constitutionality. 
This procedure is called “norm control.” 
On these bases, in 1957, the German Constitutional Court struck 
down joint taxation of married couples (i.e., filing a return together) as 
a violation of the right to marriage and the family because it effectively 
penalized being married by taxing the lower earning spouse’s income 
at a higher progressive rate than what would have applied had she not 
been married.32 In 1991, the Court struck down a rule that exempted 
interest income from withholding while wages were subject to 
 
 30.  Id. at 1195. 
 31.  See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional 
Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 264 (2006). 
 32.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Ct.] Jan. 17, 1957, 6 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 55, 1957. 
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withholding because interest was primarily earned by high income 
taxpayers, and the exemption was considered unfair.33 In 1994, the 
Court struck down the net wealth tax because the valuation rules as 
applied resulted in substantially different valuations for different kinds 
of property as compared with their market value.34 
In a more recent example, in 2014, the German Constitutional 
Court decided a norm control case from the Federal High Tax Court 
regarding the constitutionality of the new German inheritance tax 
statute.35 In the inheritance tax reform of 2008, a special exemption was 
introduced for family-owned businesses.36 The German Court held the 
exemption unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to large and 
ultra-large private businesses, reasoning that such an exemption 
privileged very wealthy persons and led to the concentration of private 
fortunes among a limited group of people. The Court held that the 
exemption was too broad, was not related to the desire to protect family 
businesses, and allowed too many possibilities for contractual designs 
to evade taxation.37 
Since the inheritance tax decision, the German Constitutional 
Court has applied these principles to several other areas of tax law. In 
May 2017, it held that parts of the German change of control rules were 
inconsistent with the principle of equality because they were arbitrary.38 
The change of control rules (as in effect before the Court’s decision) 
limited a business’ ability to use the tax loss carry forward if the 
business attained more than 50 percent of the targeted acquisition. In 
the case of acquisitions between 25 and 50 percent, a pro rata formula 
applied. This latter rule was held unconstitutional in a case involving a 
48 percent change because it was arbitrary. The Court reasoned that 
these rules were based on the principle that the taxable entity wanting 
to make use of the loss deduction must be the same as the taxable entity 
incurring the loss. The latter rule was arbitrary, according to the Court’s 
decision, because there was no rational basis for assuming a change of 
identity of the corporation when only 25 to 50 percent of the share 
capital was transferred. 
 
 33.  BVerfG June 27, 1991, 84 BVerfGE 239, 1991. 
 34.  BVerfG June 22, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 121, 1995. 
 35.  BVerfG Dec. 17, 2014, 1 BvL 21/12. 
 36.  Inheritances by natural persons were generally taxed whereas inheritances by legal 
entities were not. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  BVerfG May 12, 2017, 2 BvL 6/11. 
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In June 2017, the German Constitutional Court ruled that a tax on 
nuclear fuel was unconstitutional.39 The tax, which was introduced in 
December 2010, required nuclear operators to pay €145 per gram of 
fuel deployed in their reactors. Between 2011 and 2016, it yielded €6.3 
billion for the German budget. It was levied every time a fuel rod was 
changed and in its early years, allowed the German government to 
claim it had balanced the budget for the first time in decades. The case 
was a norm control case from Hamburg (i.e., a case referred to the 
German Court for review of constitutionality), and the Court held the 
tax unconstitutional because of arbitrariness. In other words, the tax 
was not sufficiently related to the Legislature’s intended purpose to 
reduce the use of nuclear power. 
In April 2018, the German Court held that the property tax regime 
applied in West Germany was unconstitutional.40 The crux of the 
problem, as identified by the Court, was that property tax 
determinations in Germany were based on antiquated valuations that 
were made over half a century ago: 1964 in the West and 1935 in the 
East. The Court ruled on multiple complaints against the property tax 
regime, all of which originated in West Germany. Under Section 21 of 
Germany’s property tax law, the reassessment of property valuations 
must occur every six years; however, this had not occurred since 1964, 
when East Germany was still part of the Soviet bloc, as a result of 
political tensions. 
Although the differences between the valuations of real property 
in the East and West created an obvious disparity, it was mitigated by 
the fact that municipalities determined the rate at which property taxes 
would be levied and made up for the dated land assessments by raising 
rates. The constitutional issue arising from the use of the outdated 
valuation system was that comparable properties within a municipality 
were taxed at different rates depending on the year in which they were 
built. The Court determined that this had led to “gravely unequal 
treatment” of property owners and was thus unconstitutional under 
Germany’s Basic Law 
Art. 3 (1) Basic Law always requires equitable interpretation of the 
tax base. In order to ensure a uniform burden on taxpayers, the basis 
of assessment must be chosen in such a way that it realistically 
depicts the burden of taxation in the relation of the assets to each 
 
 39.  BVerfG June 13, 2017, 2 BvL 6/13. 
 40.  BVerfG Apr. 10, 2018, 1 BvL 11/14. 
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other . . . . This applies in particular if the tax is levied at a uniform 
tax rate, since inequalities resulting from the assessment can no 
longer be corrected or compensated for at a later level of tax 
collection. 41 
In its decision, the German Constitutional Court required that the 
legislature enact and implement a new regime by the end of 2019 and 
2024 respectively.42 Until then, the current, unconstitutional system 
persists. Overall, these decisions attempted to craft a test for identifying 
tax expenditures that distinguish different groups of taxpayers in a way 
that violates the constitutional norm of equal treatment. In drawing this 
line, the Court did not need to refer to a baseline; it only needed to 
consider the distinction among different groups of taxpayers and assess 
such distinctions against both horizontal and vertical equity principles. 
B.  Italy 
In recent years, the Italian Supreme Constitutional Court (Corte 
Constituzionale) has likewise declared several tax laws 
unconstitutional. These cases also illustrate the conceptualization of 
tax expenditures as violations of equal protection. Like the German 
cases, these decisions illustrate the evaluation of differences among 
taxpayers against a norm of equality, rather than deviations from a 
normative tax base (such as the Haig Simons definition of income).43 
The Italian Court applies a test of arbitrariness in reviewing the 
constitutionality of unequal tax treatment. In Sentenza 6/2014,44 the 
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Article 1, paragraph 497 
of law no. 266/2005 (Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2006), which 
governs the tax base in the context of residential real properties 
acquisitions at public sales. Italian law imposes a 9 percent tax on the 
transfer of residential real estate (“Imposta di Registro,” which is a VAT 
substitute). In non-business purchases of residential properties in a 
private sale, the taxpayer could elect which base value the tax applies 
to, with two options: either by the fair market value of the property at 
the moment of the purchase or by reference to the property’s value as 
 
 41.  Kenneth Hall, Germany constitutional court declares country’s property tax regime 
unconstitutional, JURIST (April 11, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/04/germany-high-
court-declares-countrys-property-tax-regime-unconstitutional/. 
 42.  BVerfG Apr. 10, 2018, 1 BvL 11/14. 
 43.  U.S. tax expenditure analysis enerally uses as a normative baseline the definition of 
income developed by economists Haig and Simons in the 1930s under which income is the sum of 
consumption and the increase in savings. 
 44.  Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014. 
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reported in the land registry. In most cases, the taxpayer chooses the 
land registry value because it is usually lower, and thus the purchaser 
pays less tax. However, a non-business purchaser of a residential 
property at a public sale could only use the purchase price to determine 
the tax base. In other words, purchasers at public sale did not have a 
choice between purchase price or land registry value in determining the 
land’s taxable base. 
The Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the 
distinction between private sale and public sale violated Article 3 of 
the Constitution, which codifies the principle of equal treatment.45 The 
Court held that the law was unconstitutional because it unreasonably 
distinguished between the two groups who were otherwise identically 
situated. According to the Court, there was no good reason to prohibit 
a non-business purchaser at a public sale from choosing between the 
purchase price or the land registry value when determining the 
purchased property’s taxable base.46 For the law to have withstood 
constitutional challenge, the state would have had to show that the 
distinction was not arbitrary—in other words, the legislature would 
have to draw distinctions among groups of taxpayers in ways that 
servethe law’s intended purpose. 
In addition to this basic arbitrariness standard, the Italian Court has 
further developed a proportionality test for identifying tax 
expenditures that violate equal protection. Under that proportionality 
standard, the intent of tax expenditures must be legitimate, and the 
means must be reasonably related to that intent. In Sentenza 10/2015,47 
the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Legislative Decree 
June 25, 2008, no. 112, which increased the corporate tax rate by an 
additional 5.5 percent (later increased to 6.5 percent) only for 
corporations operating in the oil and energy sector with revenues 
exceeding twenty-five million Euros (also known as the “Robin Tax”). 
The Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the Robin 
Tax violated Article 3 and Article 53 of the Constitution, which provide 
in respective part that 
 
 
 45.  Article 3 states that “[a]ll citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, 
without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social 
conditions.” Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.]. 
 46.  Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014. 
 47.  Corte Cost., 9 febbraio 2015, n. 10, GU. 2015. 
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All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, 
without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, 
personal and social conditions. . . . [and that] Every person shall 
contribute to public expenditure in accordance with his/her tax-
payer capacity. The taxation system shall be based on criteria of 
progression.48 
The Court held that the Robin Tax violated both Articles. The court 
first recognized that the Robin Tax singled out oil and energy 
companies and reiterated its long-standing position that the 
government has broad discretion to design different taxes for different 
economic sectors. Such distinctions in taxation, however, must be 
reasonably justified so as to not become arbitrary discrimination. From 
this premise, the Court then analyzed the legislature’s reason for 
singling out the oil and energy sectors and then considered the means 
chosen to serve such intent. 
For the intent inquiry, the Court recognized that it was reasonable 
for the government to increase the corporate tax rate on corporations 
engaged in the oil and energy businesses because companies in the 
energy sector often operate in a quasi-monopoly. This means that 
consumers’ demand is inelastic even in response to high prices, and as 
a result, these companies garner greater profits than would be possible 
in a more efficient market. Moreover, a higher tax rate for better-
situated companies was justified in a period of economic downturn 
(such as 2008 when the Robin Tax was enacted) and consistent with the 
companies’ respective ability to pay. Accordingly, the Court found that 
the intent to impose a higher tax on the oil and energy sectors was 
reasonable and proportional to the companies’ ability to pay. 
Although the legislature’s intent was legitimate, the Court found 
that the Tax’s means were not reasonably related to that intent. First, 
the Court criticized the government’s approach as overbroad: Why did 
they not limit the Robin Tax to the surplus profits attributable to the 
privileged position that the oil and energy companies enjoyed in the 
market? Instead, the Robin Tax was an increase of the total tax rate 
applicable to those corporations and not a surtax imposed only on the 
extra profits attributable to such privileged positions. Second, it was 
unreasonable that the Robin Tax was permanent and did not provide a 
sunset clause triggered by the end of the economic recession. Therefore, 
the Court concluded that the Robin Tax violated Article 3 and Article 
 
 48.  Article 53 specifically states that “[e]very person shall contribute to public expenditure 
in accordance with their capability. The tax system shall be progressive.” Art. 53 Cost. 
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53 of the Constitution because although it sought to further a legitimate 
intent, the substantive law itself was not reasonably related to that 
intent.49 
Similarly, in another case, the Italian Court struck down a tax on 
the ground of unreasonable means. In Sentenza 83/2015, the petitioner 
alleged the unconstitutionality of Article 11(22) of Decree-Law No. 76 
(Preliminary Emergency Measures on the Promotion of Employment, 
Particularly Among Youth, on Social Cohesion), which imposed a 
consumption tax of 58.5 percent on all tobacco surrogate products 
(most commonly known as “e-cigarettes”), regardless of their nicotine 
content and on all the electronic components of such e-cigarettes.50 The 
Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the law violated 
Article 3 (the reasonableness principle) and Article 23 of the 
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o obligation of a personal or a 
financial nature may be imposed on any person except by law.”51 
With respect to Article 3, the Italian Court held that although the 
government has the authority and discretion to tax, such power is 
limited by Article 3’s reasonableness principle. The Court 
explainedthat although the tax on tobacco products may be justified by 
the inherent danger of such products, the same reasoning could not be 
extended to e-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine. Accordingly, the 
Italian Court found the law to be unreasonable because it would apply 
to e-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine and to products that do not 
share any characteristics with tobacco products (e.g., electronic 
components). Because e-cigarettes without nicotine pose less of a 
threat to public health, applying the 58.5 percent tax to them as well 
would be unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Regarding Article 23 of the Constitution, the Italian Court also held 
the law unconstitutional because it was overly vague. The imposition of 
a consumption tax on all products that could “substitute” for traditional 
tobacco products gave excessive discretion to the Italian tax authority 
in determining the taxable base and thus violated Article 23 of the 
Constitution, which requires that “no obligation . . . may be imposed on 
any person except by law.”52 
 
 49.  Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014. To avoid dire consequences to the Italian 
treasury, the Court abrogated the Robin Tax prospectively. Corte Cost., 9 febbraio 2015, n. 10, 
GU. 2015. 
 50.  Corte Cost., 15 aprile 2015, n. 83, G.U. 2015 
 51.  Art. 23 Cost. 
 52.  Id. 
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In general, these cases are similar to the German cases discussed 
above. They involve tax expenditures (or in some instances, tax 
penalties) that distinguish among categories of taxpayers and were 
deemed constitutionally infirm under the arbitrariness standard. The 
general conclusion is that when evaluating tax laws that differentiate 
between groups, it is not necessary to measure them against an ideal 
tax baseline (such as the Haig Simons definition of income). Rather, 
tax laws should be evaluated based on whether the deviation from 
equality is proportional to the legislative purpose. 
C.  Israel 
Israel does not have a written constitution, but the Israeli Supreme 
Court has held that ordinary laws that infringe on Basic Laws (laws that 
were passed by a super-majority and are intended to form building 
blocks for a future constitution), such as the Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom (1992), can be struck down as unconstitutional if they 
deviate from a principle of equality.53 Basic Laws can only be amended 
by a legislative super-majority and are designated as forming part of a 
future constitution. However, the Israeli Court has been more reluctant 
than the German or Italian Courts to declare tax laws unconstitutional 
onequal protection grounds. Similar to Germany and Italy, Israeli 
courts also apply an arbitrariness standard to determine when a tax law 
has improperly infringed on citizens’ constitutional rights—
particularly the principle of equality included in the Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Freedom. 
The first direct constitutional challenge to an Israeli tax law 
stemmed from the 2003 tax reform, which imposed a preferential tax 
rate on capital gains from the sale of publicly traded stock. This tax rate 
was set at 20 percent, whereas ordinary income (i.e., wages) was taxed 
at a rate of 50 percent. Shmuel Kaniel, a math professor at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, and others appealed to the Israeli Court and 
argued that the rate disparity was unconstitutional.54 
The Israeli Court accepted the claim that in principle the tax rate 
disparity was unconstitutional, but upheld the tax based on the 
“limitations clause” of the Basic Law, which permits proportional 
injuries to rights (i.e., infringements on rights, which are proportional 
 
 53.  HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal 49(4) PD 221 (1995). 
 54.  HCJ 9333/03 Shmuel Kaniel et al. v. Government 50(1) PD 277 (2005). There is no 
standing requirement in Israel, which helps explain how such a case could be brought. 
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to the legislative purpose). The Court justified the rate disparity based 
on the need to maintain international competitiveness in attracting 
capital, the need for a gradual transition from a no-tax environment, 
and the concern that invalidating the tax would destabilize the 
economy. In this case and others, the Israeli Court seemed reluctant to 
apply full-fledged substantive constitutional review to tax cases.55 
However, Chief Justice Barak laid out the conditions for a future 
constitutional challenge to tax laws on the ground of equal protection. 
He emphasized that tax laws are subject to constitutional review, just 
like other laws, and continued56 
At the present moment, I have not been convinced that there is no 
proper relationship [between the injury to rights and the purpose of 
the law]. It seems that the tax rates established in amendment 132 
do not deviate from the proper balance between the injury to 
equality on one hand, and the legislative purpose (international 
competitiveness and stock market stability) on the other hand. They 
maintain the proper relationship between the injury to the 
individual who bears an unequal tax burden and the public benefit 
(maintaining international investment in Israel and stock exchange 
stability). I said “at the present moment,” because amendment 132 
is quite recent, and there is not enough experience to evaluate it. It 
is possible, therefore, that with time there will emerge a new set of 
circumstances in which the relationship between the injury to 
equality and the public benefit will no longer be proper. As it stands 
today, we cannot hold that this relationship is improper. 
This language lays out the basis for future constitutional challenges 
to tax laws on an equal protection basis.57 And indeed in a later case 
from 2012, the Israeli Court struck down tax exemptions that were 
applied to certain towns but not to others, and without any objective 
criteria, as a violation of equal protection. Up to 2012, the Israel 
Ministry of Finance, with the approval of the Knesset (Israel 
 
 55.  See Edrey, supra note 16. 
 56.  HCJ 9333/03 Shmuel Kaniel et al. v. Government 50(1) PD 277 (2005). 
 57.  The Israeli Court also struck down a tax law on constitutional grounds, but the judicial 
review was procedural rather than substantive. See HCJ 10042/1 Quintinsky v. Knesset (2017). In 
Quintinsky, the petitioners challenged the Multiple Apartments Tax Arrangement, which 
imposed a designated tax upon owners of multiple apartments. The Israeli Court held that there 
was a substantive defect in the legislative proceedings that went “to the heart of the proceedings” 
– a violation of the principle of the participation of opposition Knesset members in the legislative 
process – that justified its annulment. It is hard to imagine the U.S. Supreme Court adopting the 
attitude of the Israeli Court to Congressional proceedings. After all, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
of 2017 was passed with no hearings and with no meaningful participation by any Democratic 
members of Congress, but it is highly unlikely that it could be challenged on these grounds. 
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parliament), periodically approved a list of the specific towns that were 
entitled to regional tax benefits. The criteria used in making this list was 
never published or subject to judicial or public review. Petitioners 
argued that this specific list of towns, determined without neutral, 
published criteria, constituted potential illegal discrimination in the use 
of public funds. The Israeli Court noted that indeed, the list was de facto 
discriminatory. It requested that the Ministry amend the law and 
establish published criteria, determining that the conferral of tax 
benefits without published guidelines constituted illegal discrimination 
and violated the equal protection to which Israelis are entitled. The 
Court viewed the regional tax benefits as tax expenditures and as a use 
of public funds, which justified strict scrutiny.58 
In general, the lesson from the comparison is that unlike the U.S., 
other countries evaluate distinctions between taxpayers not as 
deviations from an ideal tax baseline, but as deviations from a principle 
of equality, and then ask whether such deviations are proportional to 
the legislative aim. Such an analysis can also be applied to U.S. tax laws, 
as explained below. 
II.  SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS TO U.S. TAX LAW 
In the U.S., when the income tax law distinguishes between groups 
of taxpayers, the result is usually defined as a tax expenditure, i.e. a 
departure from a normative ideal tax base. Although this is the current 
understanding of tax expenditures, we have shown elsewhere that the 
concept of tax expenditures was created originally not out of a concern 
about deviations from a theoretical definition of income like Haig-
Simons, but about deviations from horizontal equity, or the idea that 
taxpayers with equal incomes should be taxed the same.59 In addition, 
most tax expenditures also violate vertical equity principles because 
they favor richer taxpayers, and the purpose of having a personal 
income tax is to reduce systemic inequality.60 
In what follows we will examine some of the larger U.S. tax 
expenditures and show that many of them would not survive 
constitutional scrutiny under the criteria used by the foreign courts 
surveyed above. 
 
 58.  HCJ 8300/02 Gadban Nasser v. The Government of the State of Israel (2006). 
 59.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Nir Fishbien, Tax Expenditures and Horizontal Equity: A Lost 
Lesson from Stanley S. Surrey (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 60.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 9 (2006). 
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A.  The Exclusion of Employer Provided Health Care Premiums from 
Income 
Under current law, employer-paid health insurance premiums and 
other medical expenses (including long-term care) are not included in 
employee gross income, even though the employer deducts them as a 
business expense.61 This exclusion is the largest tax expenditure in the 
federal budget, costing $2.786 trillion from 2019 to 2028.62 This 
exclusion means that employees who work for an employer that 
provides such benefits receive a tax subsidy because they do not have 
to include the employer’s contribution to their health insurance and 
medical care (for self-insured employers) as income. Employees who 
do not receive health benefits and self-employed individuals generally 
must pay for health insurance and medical care with after-tax dollars. 
The exclusion imposes some major costs. First, as noted above, it leads 
to a considerable loss of revenue. Second, it is regressive, because tax 
rates rise with income and thus high-income taxpayers benefit most 
from the exclusion. Third, it is biased towards more robust insurance 
coverage because premiums are paid with before-tax dollars and 
therefore the cost does not fall on the taxpayer. 
Some might argue that this exclusion is justified on some non-tax 
superiorities, for instance, holding together our existing system of 
employer-provided insurance. But empirical literature undermines this 
position. First, it is unlikely that medium and large firms will wholesale 
exit the employer-provided insurance because of other non-tax 
benefits, such as the negotiating power obtained with group size, 
benefits of group purchase, and ease of plan choice and administration. 
Second, when the scale of the non-group market is dramatically 
increased by individuals leaving employer-provided insurance, the non-
group market might function better and provide lower prices. Besides, 
the promotion of the employer-sponsored insurance system is not 
necessarily a benefit to society because it distorts the labor market by 
limiting job-to-job mobility and warping retirement decisions.63 
 
 61.  I.R.C. § 106(a) (2020). 
 62.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, item 130 
(2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Tax-Expenditures-2021.pdf [hereinafter TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS]. 
 63.  The economic effects of this tax expenditure seem to be deleterious, because many 
employees do not leave their jobs because of the health insurance, even though they would prefer 
otherwise. See Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job 
Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, in HEALTH POLICY AND THE UNINSURED 97 
(Catherine McLaughlin ed., 2004). 
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There is no rational justification for U.S. tax law’s distinction 
between employer coverage and independently purchased coverage, 
other than history and political popularity. To achieve horizontal equity, 
Congress should either repeal the expenditure and include the 
premiums as income or let people who do not receive such benefits 
from their employer create equivalent tax-free health savings accounts. 
The goal of the tax law is to encourage individuals to obtain health 
insurance coverage, and it is not proportional to this goal to grant 
coverage only to those people whose employers pay into their health 
plans. 
B.  The Exclusion of Gifts and Bequests from Income 
Generally, and under a Haig-Simons definition of income as the 
sum of consumption and the increase in savings, gifts and bequests 
should be included in income.64 Under current law, the value of 
property acquired by a gift or bequest is excluded from taxable income 
(but also not deductible to the donor).65 The Department of Treasury 
estimates the cost of those tax expenditures (based on carryover basis 
and the potential capital gains on gifts) to be $29.35 billion from 2019 
to 2028.66 This exclusion is hard to justify as it perpetuates generational 
wealth and benefits the rich who inherit substantial resources, 
excluding everyone else. The federal estate tax only applies to the 
super-rich and could be abolished if gifts and bequests were included 
in income. Accordingly, the omission of gifts and bequests reduces the 
redistributive power of the income tax and raises questions of equity. 
Some may justify the exclusion on the ground that the donor has 
already paid the tax by making a gift out of after-tax income. Yet this 
argument fails to address the problem of unequal tax treatment 
between a donee who lives off the munificence of others and an 
employee who works hard to finance herself.67 Taxing the hard working 
employee but exempting the free giving donor is an apparent violation 
of horizontal equity absent valid purpose. 
No rational basis can be identified for this exclusion. Although 
 
 64.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 200 (1985). 
 65.  I.R.C § 102 (1986). 
 66.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 75. Under the baseline tax 
system, unrealized capital gains would be taxed when assets are transferred by gift. In contrast, 
under current law, when a gift of appreciated asset is made, the donor’s basis in the transferred 
property carries over to the donee. The carryover of the donor’s basis allows a continued deferral 
of unrealized capital gains. 
 67.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 201. 
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relieving certain intra-family affectionate gifts from taxation might be 
a valid purpose, excluding all gifts would be disproportionate to this 
intent, because it covers gifts that are not motivated by familial 
affection and excludes from income increases in ability to pay that are 
not excluded in any other contexts. Congress should thus repeal this 
exclusion on horizontal equity grounds. 
C.  The Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Bonds from Income 
Under current law, interest earned on state and local government 
bonds is generally tax-exempt.68 This is a tax expenditure that will cost 
the federal government $397.87 billion from 2019 to 2028.69 This 
expenditure is meant to indirectly subsidize state and local government; 
however, that only works when the difference in the interest rate 
between taxable and tax-exempt bonds is equal to the top marginal tax 
rate, which only happens if individuals subject to the top rate purchase 
all the tax-exempt bonds.70 If the difference is less than the marginal tax 
rate, that is because individuals outside the top tax bracket purchased 
such bonds, so some proportion of the tax expenditure would actually 
benefit the super-wealthy and not state and local government. Less 
wealthy people who purchase such bonds do not benefit because the 
difference in interest rates is equal to the avoided tax.71 
Congress should abolish this exclusion on horizontal equity 
grounds because it is not proportional to its purpose. To be 
proportional to its purpose, this exclusion be more efficient: Congress 
could use the revenue obtained from the repeal of this exclusion to 
directly subsidize state and local governments.72 As long as the 
exemption of the interest inures not to the benefit of state and local 
government but rather to rich individuals, the exemption cannot be 





 68.  I.R.C. § 103 (1988). 
 69.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 169. 
 70.  Clifton Fleming Jr and Robert J Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and 
Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 446–47 (2008). 
 71.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 211. 
 72.  JOHN K. MCNULTY & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS 101 (7th ed. 2004). 
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D.  The Deductibility of Home Mortgage Interest and Local Property 
Taxes 
Notwithstanding the general rule that expenses incurred in relation 
to untaxed investment (such as the investment of purchasing an owner-
occupied home) are not deductible, current law allows an owner-
occupant to deduct, under certain circumstances, mortgage interest 
paid on her primary residence. Additionally, an owner-occupant may 
take a deduction for local property taxes paid on real property (the 
2017 tax reform capped the deductibility of any taxes paid in any 
taxable year, including for local property taxes, to $10,000).73 The 
combined cost of these tax expenditures to the federal government is 
$818.45 billion between 2019 and 2028.74 These deductions create an 
unprincipled distinction between homeowners who can claim them and 
renters who cannot.75 Homeowners also benefit from the exclusion of 
the imputed income from home ownership (worth $1.536 trillion over 
2019 to 2028).76 
The alleged purpose of these deductions is to encourage home 
ownership—to make buying a home more accessible—but empirical 
research conducted in the U.S. shows that these deductions may have a 
larger effect on the size of homes purchased than on the decision to 
become a homeowner.77 In other words, these deductions are inefficient 
and ineffective at achieving their stated purpose, as they 
disproportionately benefit wealthier individuals in purchasing more 
expensive property. An alternative policy explanation for the mortgage 
interest deduction is the promotion of tax equity between outright 
homeowners, who enjoy untaxed imputed income, and mortgaged 
homeowners, who do not have net imputed income. If the logic 
underlying this explanation were valid, rental costs should also be 
deductible for the equity between outright homeowners and renters. 
Permitting deductions only for mortgaged homeowners is unfair to 
 
 73.  I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3), 164(a). 
 74.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, items 60-61 (for home mortgage 
interest ($597,610) and local property taxes ($220,840), respectively). 
 75.  See also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 233. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
introduced the low-income housing credit, which generally allowed a nonrefundable credit for 
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated qualified low-income housing projects. See 
Section 42. However, the credit is considered relatively unsubstantial. For more, see Briefing 
Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-
housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work (last visited Sept. 8, 2019). 
 76.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 64. 
 77.  See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND 
PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 14–15 (2014). 
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renters and is not predicated on a rational distinction between the two 
consumer groups. Whether one is paying a mortgage or paying rent, 
they are paying for housing all the same. Congress should amend these 
deductions to comply with horizontal equity by either allowing similar 
deductions for renters or removing such deductions entirely. 
E.  Step Up of Basis at Death 
Under current law, capital gains on assets held at the owner’s death 
are not subject to the capital gains tax. Nonetheless, the cost basis of 
the appreciated assets is adjusted to the market value at the owner’s 
date of death (stepped-up basis), which becomes the basis for the 
heirs.78 This tax expenditure will cost the federal government $622.2 
billion from 2019 to 2028.79 This tax expenditure has no rational basis, 
because it is possible to calculate the original basis (cost) of real and 
personal property. The exclusion means that everyone is subject to the 
capital gains tax except heirs, and that people will be reluctant to sell 
assets when they are old even if they would normally prefer to 
downsize their home. Again, this exclusion mostly helps the rich 
because everyone gets an exclusion of the first $500,000 on the sale of 
a primary residence. It is not proportional to any articulable legislative 
goal to allow all heirs to sell appreciated properties without paying any 
tax, while non-heirs have to pay full tax on the appreciation in their 
capital assets. Congress should abolish this exclusion on horizontal 
equity grounds.80 
F.  The Capital Gains and Dividends Preference 
Under current law, qualified dividends are taxed at a preferentially 
low rate—not higher than 20 percent—rather than the marginal 
individual tax rate (up to 39.6 percent). In addition, capital gains on 
assets held for more than one year are generally taxed at the same 
preferentially low rate. Here, the total cost to the government will be 
$1.536 trillion between 2019 and 2028.81 Preferentially low rate on 
dividend income and capital gains benefit the wealthy, because large 
portions of their income are derived from such passive sources. 
Nonetheless, as long as we have a realization requirement, the capital 
 
 78.  I.R.C. § 1014 (2015). 
 79.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 74. 
 80.  See also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 254. 
 81.  See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, items 71−72 (for qualified dividends 
($384,120) and capital gains ($1,152,610), respectively). 
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gains preference mitigates lock-in, protects from inflation, and prevents 
bunching.82 In addition, the capital gains and dividends rates achieve 
partial integration of the corporate and shareholder tax. Congress 
should evaluate these issues and the inequity they create, and, at a 
minimum, reduce the disparity between the capital gains and ordinary 
income rates. 
III.  THE ANSWER 
So should the U.S. follow other countries and constitutionalize 
income tax law? In other areas, the U.S. has reduced American tax 
exceptionalism, for example by adopting partial integration of 
corporate/shareholder taxes in 2003 and a participation exemption in 
2017. Should federal tax laws be subject to constitutional scrutiny? 
In the current state of affairs, the answer must be “no.” The stakes 
are too high because the Court gets the final word. And the current 
Court is not up to the task. First, the majority of the current Justices 
incline toward textualism, which would prevent them from asking what 
Congress intended in, for example, enacting the home mortgage 
interest deduction. Inquiry into legislative purpose is essential to 
measuring deviations from equality against legislative intent under a 
constitutional proportionality standard. 
Second, the Court lacks a well-developed doctrine of 
proportionality.83 Even if it found that a given deviation from equality 
was not required to advance Congress’ purpose, the Court lacks the 
analytical tools to conduct a nuanced inquiry about the extent of the 
injury and whether other means could be used. In addition, some judges 
may feel that evaluating the costs and benefits of a departure from 
equality under proportionality is more appropriate for a legislature 
than for the judicial branch. 
Third, the Court does not understand tax law. This is evident in 
some of its recent federal tax decisions like Gitlitz v. Commissioner84 
and PPL Corp. v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,85 
which were excessively formalistic and reached absurd results.86 The 
 
 82.  REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & DMITRY ZELIK, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES 363 (Michael Littlewood & Craig Elliffe eds., 2017). 
 83.  For a thorough explanation of proportionality, see generally AHARON BARAK, 
PROPORTIONALITY (2012). 
 84. 531 U.S. 206 (2001) (8-1 decision). 
 85. 569 U.S. 329 (2013) (unanimous decision). 
 86. Most tax scholars believe both were wrongly decided. See, e.g., McMahon, Jr., Martin 
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fact that the Court rarely takes up federal tax cases does not help, nor 
does the fact that no Justice and few clerks have training in tax. Even 
Justice Ginsburg, whose late husband was an renowned tax lawyer, 
joined the misguided majority in Gitlitz. 
But this does not mean that the constitutional inquiry is worthless. 
Congress is charged with upholding the Constitution too, and Congress 
can ask when considering a tax expenditure (a) what its purpose in 
deviating from equality is, and (b) whether the deviation is 
proportional and necessary. These are the two main issues underlying 
the foreign decisions surveyed above, and Congress can learn from the 
way these courts analyzed the issues of equality and proportionality. 
Congress also has the requisite tax expertise. In fact, this could be a new 
process for the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: For every tax 
expenditure, the Joint Committee should ask not just how much it costs 
in foregone revenue, but also whether the deviation from equality is 
justified in terms of Congress’ purpose. A report along these lines may 
persuade members of Congress to stop listening to lobbyists and cut 
back on some of the more egregious tax expenditures. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to address the question of why the 
Supreme Court has not held that a federal income tax provision was 
unconstitutional since 1920. It then explains how supreme courts in 
three other liberal democracies (Germany, Italy and Israel) measure 
tax provisions against a constitutional standard of equality by first 
analyzing the legislative purpose behind the rule and then assessing 
whether the departure from equality is proportional to the legislative 
purpose. Finally, the article gives a preliminary evaluation of some of 
the larger US tax expenditures and shows that they would have been 
ruled unconstitutional had the same standard used abroad been 
applied to them. The article concludes by urging Congress to assess tax 
laws, and especially tax expenditures, against a constitutional equal 
protection standard, since the Supreme Court as currently constituted 
is not up to this task. 
 
James, Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 
1722 (2003); Goldin, Jacob, Reconsidering Substance Over Form in PPL, TAX NOTES 
VIEWPOINTS 1229 (2012). 
